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IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSITUTIONAL ·PROBLEMS. By Raoul Ber-
ger,t Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1973. Pp. 
xii, 345. $14.95. Reviewed by Honorable Hall Hammond.tt 
Virtue, it is said, is its own reward. The virtues of scholarly research 
in depth and of sound and penetrating analysis of the problems that the 
processes of impeachment present, shine from every page of Raoul 
Berger's book. These virtues have led to the traditional reward of high 
praise from his peers to a colleague who has distinguished himself in the 
academic, legal, and governmental communities. To cite but a few 
briefly, Professor Philip Kurland (with whose view Berger differs from 
time to time) said: "This is a serious, scholarly effort .... Berger's 
book has much to tell us. And we shall be grateful to him for his 
scholarship and his capacity to express himself so lucidly on a subject 
that will always be shrouded in some darkness."1 
Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., says that Berger's "writings are 
distinguished by vigorous and exhaustive research, by thoughtful and 
ingenious argument, by pungent summation and by an independence of 
mind constrained only by a fundamental commitment to the American 
Constitution."2 J. Willard Hurst of the University of Wisconsin Law 
School says "Raoul Berger conveys the excitement of high policy, while 
he advances challenging new theses and does it all with sure, deft 
craftmanship which makes even the footnotes good reading." 3 
I agree with these gentlemen and I am pleased that Berger has 
received a well earned academic due and gratitude for his contribution 
to those who must recall, either from the theoretical or the practical 
point of view that there exists the mechanism of impeachment. And I 
have the further happy thought that this "serious, scholarly" book 
which entirely fortuitously came to fruition during the time of 
Watergate and Vice President Agnew's involvement with the Federal 
Grand Jury in Baltimore, will sell so many timely copies at a not 
inconsiderable price that the author's reward will not be limited to his 
virtue but will be substantially increased by coin of the realm, devalued 
and inflated though it be. 
The Founding Fathers when they adopted the Constitution of the 
United States were of course familiar with the common law, the history 
of impeachment in England and with the fact that one of the longest 
t Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal History, Harvard Law School. 
tt Retired Chief Judge, Maryland Court of Appeals. 
1. Kurland. Book Review, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1973, at 3 (Book Review). 
2. Schlesinger, Book Review, The Washington Post, June 10, 1973, at 1-2 (Book World). 
3. Hurst, Book Review, The Washington Post. May 9, 1973, at F2, col. 2 (Style). 
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and most famous of English impeachments, that of Warren Hastings, 
was under way in the summer of 1787 when the Constitutional 
Convention gathered in Philadelphia.4 Berger notes they were aware 
that impeachment developed in the fourteenth century as a weapon of 
Parliament to fight the King in the battle for supremacy and that 
impeachment reached its most effective utilization in the seventeenth 
century. The King himself could not be reached but the House of 
Commons could indict high officers of the King for a variety of 
offenses and hale them before the House of Lords for a trial that was 
essentially criminal in nature. Thus, Parliament which could not control 
the King directly could do so indirectly. The Founding Fathers, know-
ing history and human nature, had no intention of permitting potential 
abuses of presidential power to be beyond corrective reach. Their real 
preoccupation in this area was the President and only at the last and 
somewhat casually did they make "all civil officers of the United 
States"S subject to removal by impeachment. 
Berger declares that: 
The path by which the Framers arrived at this language is 
traceable in the records of the Convention. Initially, impeach-
ment was to be based upon "malpractice or neglect of duty." In 
the Committee of Detail this became '·'treason, bribery or 
corruption," and was then reduced by the Committee of Eleven 
to "treason or bribery." [sic] When George Mason suggested on 
the floor of the Convention the addition of "maladministra-
tion," Madison remarked that it was "so vague," [as to make 
the tenure of a President at the pleasure of the Congress] 
whereupon Mason substituted "high crimes and misdemeanors," 
which was adopted without demur. 
The phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" Berger demonstrates, is 
a term of art with ascertainable limits; it means high crimes and high 
misdemeanors and high misdemeanors are not limited to criminal or 
indictable offenses but include (or really mean) political crimes against 
the state and public interest. Political crimes cannot be precisely defined 
but rather are to be explained by examples and categorized as they are 
by Berger. As to high midemeanors, one senses Mr. Justice Stewart's 
dilemma when he contemplated hard core pornography-he could not 
define it but he knew it when he saw it. 
The "excitement of high policy" and the "challenging new theses"6 
which Hurst said Berger conveyed and advanced is well illustrated in his 
chapter discussing judicial review of an impeaching ouster by the 
Senate. 
Berger enthusiastically and somewhat ingeniously argues that the 
4. The impeachment proceedings commenced in May, 1787 and lasted for seven years. 
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 provides: "The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of 
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 
6. Hurst, supra note 3. 
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Supreme Court can ultimately decide whether the charged misconduct 
constitutes an impeachable offense,? although he acknowledges that 
" [f) rom Story onward it has been thought that in the domain of 
impeachment the Senate has the last word; that even the issue whether 
the charged misconduct constitutes an impeachable offense is unreview-
able, because the trial of impeachments is confided to the Senate 
alone."s 
In challenging this long and widely held view, Berger would seem to 
have adopted the position that "I may be wrong but I am not in doubt" 
(as an engaging business and political leader in Maryland was wont to 
say some years ago). Indeed in his prefatory acknowlegements Berger 
states: "If I have persisted in 'error' it was not for want of searching 
criticism but because one must have the fortitude to adhere to 
hard-won conclusions which are not shaken by criticism, however high 
its source.,,9 
Despite his "hard-won" conviction I am not persuaded that his 
conclusions are sound or that his arguments would prevail if a case 
arose in which they could be made. Berger relies mainly on Powell u. 
McCormack I 0 in which the Supreme Court held that exclusion from 
the House was limited by the Constitution to the requirements of age, 
citizenship, and residence and that, although the Constitution made the 
House the judge of the qualifications of its members, it could not 
exclude Adam Clayton Powell for serious misconduct. From this 
holding he argues: "The Senate may convict for 'treason'; by Article 
III, § 3, 'treason' is defined as levying war against the United States or 
giving aid and comfort to its enemies. Suppose the Senate convicts the 
President of treason on the ground that he attempted to subvert the 
Constitution .... "1 I Plainly this would amount to adding a new 
ground for impeachment which the Supreme Court could and should 
invalidate. 
Of course, it is not to be reasonably imagined that the House would 
indict for treason if the offense was a high misdemeanor, as attempting 
to subvert the Constitution would be, and the Senate would convict if it 
did. Assuming, however, that what Berger hypothesizes did occur there 
are, as I see it, compelling indications that the Supreme Court has no 
right to review and would not attempt to do so. There is the stark 
language of the Constitution: "The House of Representatives ... shall 
have the sole Power of Impeachment,,12 and "[t] he Senate shall have 
the sole Power to try all Impeachments."1 3 That the Supreme Court 
was to have no part in the impeachment proceeding is fortified by the 
7. R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 103-07 (1973) (citations omitted) 
[hereinafter cited as BERGER). 
8. Id. at 103 (citations omitted). 
9. Id. at vii. 
10. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
11. BERGER 106. 
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
13. Id. § 3. 
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realization that the Framers originally entrusted the trial of impeach-
ments to the Supreme Court but then made the Senate the tribunal for 
trials.! 4 One reason for the change said Gouverneur Morris was: 
that the Supreme Court was to try the President [upon 
indictment] after the trial of the impeachment [unlike the 
English practice under which the Lords tried both issues] . 
. . . So too, Roger Sherman "regarded the Supreme Court as 
improper to try the President because the judges would be 
appointed by him" and inferentially would therefore be partial 
to him. These views were expanded by Hamilton in The 
Federalist;! 5 [in Hamilton's view] the Senate would be 
"unawed" by the fact that the House lodged charges, [but] it 
was doubtful whether the Supreme Court would be "endowed 
with so evident a portion of fortitude" to execute "so difficult 
a task."! 6 
Unlike the Framers, Berger's main concern with impeachment is not 
its application to the presidency but to the judiciary. He makes a good, 
and to me, a convincing case that impeachment is not the exclusive 
means for the removal of federal judges. Judges hold office during 
"good behavior."! 7 When the Framers limited judicial tenure to "good 
behavior;" they did not intend that a judge who misbehaved and so 
violated the condition of his tenure should continue his office. "There 
are no dead words in the Constitution"! 8 and every word must be 
given effect. At common law judicial tenure during good behavior was 
terminated by misbehavior, which was "every voluntary act done by an 
officer contrary to that which belongs to his office .... ,,] 9 Lord Coke 
specified three causes for forfeiture of office: "abusing, not using and 
refusing."20 Impeachable offenses and high crimes and misdemeanors 
are not the only forms of misbehavior which render a judge unfit to 
continue in office; therefore, federal judges whose offenses do not 
amount to a high crime or high misdemeanor should be tried and 
removed by their fellow judges (in deference to the rule of separation 
of powers). 
Berger thinks that the Congress should not waste its time in 
considering and deciding whether to oust dreary little judges for squalid 
misconduct and Congress has indicated it will not do so. He discusses 
Professor Kurland's view that there would not be many, if any, dreary 
little judges guilty of squalid misconduct if federal judicial appoint-
ments could really be made on merit alone rather than as "prime 
14. However, during the impeachment trial the Chief Justice presides over the Senate. 
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (A. Hamilton). 
16. BERGER 112-13 (citations omitted). 
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
18. BERGER 132. 
19. [d. at 127 n.28. 
20. [d. at 160. 
1973] Book Reviews 167 
patronage plums to be awarded by Senators in acknowledgement of 
party or personal loyalty,,21 and agrees with Kurland that it is 
unrealistic to expect any improvement in the process of appointment of 
federal judges in the foreseeable future. 
Berger's fortitude as to hard-won conclusions is manifest in his 
chapter on the impeachment of Justice Chase. He strongly rejects the 
long accepted opinion that "the acquittal of Justice Samuel Chase 
represents the triumph of justice over heated political partisanship.,,2 2 
He pictures Chase as an "implacably prejudiced judge,,2 3 who should 
have been removed "as a standing reminder"2 4 to other judges similarly 
bent. If he had made his argument before an appellate court on which I 
sat, my vote would have been against his view and in favor of long 
accepted opinion. (I have often been chargc--d as too friendly to stare 
decisis.) 
The chapter on the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson is 
Berger at his very best, and this is high praise. It would be hard to differ 
with his analysis that the impeachment of Johnson was "a gross abuse 
of the impeachment process, an attempt to punish the President for 
differing with and obstructing the policy of Congress.,,2 5 In essence 
Johnson was impeached because he declined to execute a law, the 
Tenure of Office Act, that in his view and that of the cabinet-and later 
in the opinion of the Supreme Court-was unconstitutional. Must a 
president execute a duly enacted law that he considers unconstitu-
tional? Berger says ordinarily he must but (here he shows that his 
fortitude as to hard-won conclusions is not ineluctable for he 
acknowledges a change from his earlier position) he now agrees with 
Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase that this general rule does not apply 
where the law "directly attacks and impairs the executive power"26 
confided to the President by the Constitution. 
I end on a more pedestrian level. The Bibliography, the General 
Index, and the Index of Cases meet the same very high standards of all 
that goes before in the book. 
21. [d. at 165. 
22. [d. at 224. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. at 295. 
26. [d. 
